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Abstract— Market-based resource allocation is a
promising model for dealing with the growing Util-
ity Computing environments, such as Grid or Cloud
Computing. Agents that represent both service
clients and providers meet in a market to negotiate
the terms of the sale of resources. Additive negotia-
tion models are extended because they are simple, but
they are not valid for negotiations whose terms are
not independent between them. This paper proposes
a simple non-additive model for performing negotia-
tions and demonstrates its validity through simulation
experiments.
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I. Introduction
In the recent years, the big mainframes paradigm
where users own their computing resources[1], is be-
ing progressively transiting to a more utility-driven
paradigm, where users do not own their resources
and pay for the usage of remote resources [2].
The Grid[3] and, more recently, Cloud Comput-
ing[4] are the most promising current implementa-
tions of Utility Computing, the first in scientific and
academic environments, and the second in the busi-
ness world. This new evolution has made the clas-
sical Resource Management mechanisms very inef-
ficient because some reasons, such as the growing
complexity of finding optimum resource allocations,
conflicts of interest between users from different or-
ganisations, introduction of new business metrics[5],
worldwide dispersion of the systems, etc.
Having into account these arguments, large sys-
tems seem to be too complex to be managed cen-
trally. Market-based resource management is pro-
posed as a decentralised paradigm to deal with the
complexity by the next reasons:
• The possibility of doing business will motivate
service providers to offer their resources in the
system and give a Quality of Service (QoS) ac-
cording to their real capacity.
• Market mechanisms obligate the users to adjust
their reservations of the system, both in time
and space, to their real requirements.
• It is relatively easy to implement in a decen-
tralised architecture.
• The complexity is reduced, because participants
enter in the market looking for the satisfaction
of their own necessities, and they do not need
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to know the global status of the system to max-
imise their utility.
In market-based utility computing scenario, bro-
kers that represent service providers or clients partic-
ipate in a market to sell or buy their services. When
the clients find there their necessities, a negotiation
process is started to establish the terms of the con-
tract (QoS, price, time slots). If both parts reach
an agreement, the terms of the contract are specified
in a Service Level Agreement (SLA) and the client
application can acquire the bought resource. Dur-
ing the usage of the resources, the component called
SLA Enforcement watches for the correct fulfilment
of the terms of the SLA, and penalises the buyers or
the sellers if they violate the SLAs.
Since brokers that negotiate for the buying and
selling of services are autonomous agents (this is,
they communicate between them and take decisions
without human intervention), it is needed to pro-
vide them some economic models and intelligent be-
haviour so they are able to take the best decisions
for their represented actors in the market (client ap-
plications or service providers) and maximise their
utility.
This paper enhances existing economic models for
negotiation and applies them to the sales of services
and resources between computing agents: when the
resource broker negotiates an SLA with the broker
of a Client, it has into account some economic terms,
such as price, penalties for contract violation, time,
etc. In addition, there are other terms in the SLA,
which are more technical, and also can have influ-
ence in the economic terms, specially those related
with the Quality of Service (QoS) (e.g. throughput,
response time...) or those related with the sales of
plain resources (number of CPUs, speed, memory...).
For a purely-economic resource broker, it is very dif-
ficult to quantify the terms of the SLAs, since it has
not enough technical knowledge about the status and
punctual capacities of the resources, since it deter-
mines if a task can be executed or not, and the min-
imum price to make this task profitable for the re-
source provider.
Having these arguments into account, the main
contributions of this work are:
1. Modelling and characterisation of the negotia-
tions required to perform sophisticated sales in
Market-Based Utility Computing in function of
the desirable objectives, that also will be defined
and studied.
2. Evaluation of the proposed economic models for
the negotiation between brokers for the sale of
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computing utilities. This includes the compar-
ison of several values for the parameters of the
model and the evaluation about its feasibility
and influence in the achievement of desired ob-
jectives.
3. Usage of low-level dynamic knowledge, pro-
vided by the resource fabrics, for giving support
to economic negotiations. The required knowl-
edge is defined by the contributions enumerated
in point 1 and 2, and is acquired in real-time
from the monitorisation of the Resource Fabrics.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Sec-
tion II describes the component created to deal with
both economic and technical issues in the market.
Section III describes the scenario where the negoti-
ations carry out. Section IV described the models
used for the negotiation. Section V describes the
evaluation environment and the results of the simu-
lation. Finally, section VI shows the conclusions of
this work and points to some future research lines.
II. Economically Enhanced Resource
Management
To help market brokers taking decisions about the
sales of the resource fabrics, an Economically En-
hanced Resource Manager (EERM) [6], [7] is intro-
duced as an intermediate point to deal with the eco-
nomical and technical issues.
The EERM interacts with various other compo-
nents, namely a Market Broker and the Resource
Fabrics. There is a Utility Computing Market, which
is a middleware where client and provider brokers
query the prices and offer the services on the Market,
respectively. Resource Fabrics refers to Grid Middle-
wares such as Condor [1], Globus [8], or Web Appli-
cation Servers such as Tomcat.
The main functions of EERM are:
• Decide whether incoming tasks are accepted or
not, based of the usage of the resources for a
given time slot, the client priority, and the sale
price.
• Calculate prices for offered jobs and services
based in current market status, current resource
usage and predictions about the impact of a job
in the usage of resources.
• Check that the accepted SLAs can be kept. If
one or more SLAs can not be fulfilled it takes
the decision to suspend or cancel jobs to ensure
the fulfilment of the other SLAs and maximise
overall revenue.
• It is responsible of the communication with the
local resource managers and influences the local
resource management to achieve a more efficient
global resource use.
The behaviours in the previously enumerated func-
tions can be tuned with policies.
III. Negotiation Protocol
Before the negotiation starts, the EERM of the
Service Provider must register its offered services in
the Service Discovery component. For each ser-
vice, it is provided some semantic information that
allows to identify what service is and its functional-
ities, and an extra meta-SLA with some data about
the SLA terms (also known as Service Level Objec-
tives) that the service provider is willing to negotiate,
such as response time, throughput, quality (for ex-
ample in video compression), duration of the service,
etc.
When a Client Broker wants to acquire a ser-
vice, it queries the Service Discovery by providing
some semantic information, and the Service Discov-
ery returns a list of the Service Providers that match
the requirements (every provider has its own EERM)
and the meta-data about the negotiable SLA terms.
The next process is similar to the one described
in the WS-Agreement specification [9], but with an
extra iteration in the negotiation. Before starting
the negotiation the Client Broker selects the most
interesting services, and creates a proposal of agree-
ment for each one; using the meta-data it creates an
uncompleted SLA with its requirements, and leaves
other SLOs as void, to be completed by the EERM
in the next negotiation process.
When the EERM receives the SLA proposal, it
evaluates if the proposed terms can be accepted. If
the Client broker received from the EERM an accep-
tance message or a counter-offer, it evaluates it and
finishes the negotiation by not accepting the SLA or
by sending a confirmation message to the EERM.
A. Assumptions
Since this paper is focused in the negotiation pro-
cess, some components of a Market are ignored and
assumed that they are present:
• There is already a service discovery mechanism
where providers can offer their services, and
clients can look for them by providing some se-
mantic information.
• The EERM has a SLA decomposition compo-
nent that is able to translate from the Service
Level Objectives (SLO) that compose the SLA,
such as response time or throughput, to system-
level thresholds, that are used to assign the cor-
rect number of resources to a service, for fulfill-
ing the agreed SLA.
IV. Negotiation Model
A. Characterisation of the negotiation
Once the scenario has been defined, it is time to
define the content and details of the research of this
paper. Since it is focused in the usage of resource-
level information for enhancing the SLA negotiation
in utility computing markets, the first step to do is
to characterise the negotiation. To do that, this pa-
per takes into account the Organizing Questions that
Raiffa proposed in his book [10].
Two monolithic parties Broker agents can take
the negotiation decisions autonomically.
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Repetitive game What one of the parties do in a
negotiation can be taken into account in future
negotiations (reputation)
Multiple issues Such as price, time and several
SLOs.
Some fixed threats If there is no agreement, the
client will look for another provider; if the
provider oversells its resources, there is the
threat breaking the SLAs.
Binding contracts And there are entities such as
SLA Enforcement to check at any moment that
the contracts are being fulfilled and, if not, make
the violating party to pay a penalisation.
Cooperative antagonism The disputants recognise
that they have differences of interests; they
would like to find a compromise. They do not
have malevolent intentions, but neither are they
altruistically inclined.
B. On the usage of non-additive utility functions
The first issue that must be defined is the analytic
model for representing the negotiations that will be
performed by the Economy Agent. This model must
take into account the negotiated SLOs and other
terms, such as client classification or reservation slots
plus the sale price.
Traditional negotiation models for utility comput-
ing are based in the “two parties, many issues”
model proposed by Raiffa[10] and Faratin [11]. This
model is pretty easy to manage and calculate the
maximum and minimum utilities: during the nego-
tiation process, the provider can know easily which
addends to increase or decrease in order to increase
the utility and keep it the nearest possible to the
maximum. However, it has a problem: it is an ad-
ditive model which assumes that all the factors are
independent from the others. This is not true, since
some factors such as the price are strongly related
with the SLOs, the type of client, etc.
Let S be the SLA under negotiation, the non-
additive utility function U used in this paper for
the service provider is the next:
U(S) =
m∑
i=1
oiui(S) (1)
Where m is the number of goals for the provider,
such as revenue maximisation, high reputation,
performance maximisation, high occupation of re-
sources, satisfaction of certain type of users, etc. ui is
the sub-utility function that defines how much will be
the objective i satisfied, and oi is a number between
0 and 1 that defines the priority that the provider
assigns to the concrete objective. It must be consid-
ered that
∑m
i=1 oi = 1.
Although Equation 1 is similar to an additive func-
tion, actually it is not. Instead of calculating each of
the sub-utility functions in function of a single SLA
term and finally add them up, Equation 1 calculates
all the sub-utilities in function of the whole SLA.
This is because the different objectives are not inde-
pendent from the others and, for example, revenue
maximisation can affect negatively the client satis-
faction. Following this example, an additive func-
tion will suppose that increasing the revenue will
always increase the general utility, but that might
require to break some agreed SLAs [7], [12] and in
consequence, decrease the general user satisfaction.
If the weight assigned to the user-satisfaction goal is
higher than the assigned to revenue maximisation,
the global utility will decrease instead of increase.
The usage of non-additive utility functions will al-
low a more accurate definition of the utility; however,
finding the maximum utility analytically is much
more difficult.
C. Negotiation terms and Utility functions
First is needed to define the set O of objectives,
the set S of SLA terms and the utility function U(S)
that calculates how beneficial the proposed SLA for
the objectives of the provider is.
Let O ⊆ {orv, occ, oph, orp} the set of objectives,
where:
• orv is the objective that defines the maximisa-
tion of the revenue. The higher is the revenue
the higher is urv.
• occ is an objective used for client classification
[13]. This gives preference to the local users (or
users from a near organisation) over the users
from non-related organisations.
• oph is the objective that gives preference to tasks
or services to be executed in off-peak hours, to
prevent the system overload during peak hours.
• orp is the objective used for maximising the rep-
utation of the provider [14].
The simulations performed in this paper demon-
strate how the behaviour of the provider can be mod-
ulated only by changing the values of the components
of O that multiply their associated sub-utility func-
tions urv, ucc, uph, urp in negotiation time as can be
shown in the general utility function (Equation 2).
U(s) = orvurv + occucc + ophuph + orpurp (2)
The next subsections describe and justify the sub-
utility functions in the simulation, calculated in base
to the SLA S ⊆ {M, C, CP, Rev,∆t}, where M, C
are the Memory and CPUs amount to acquire, 0 ≤
CP ≤ 0 is the indicator of Client Priority, ∆t is the
time slot where the resources are assigned and Rev is
the revenue acquired by the sale. All the sub-utilities
are normalised to the same range [−1, 1] because oth-
erwise the influence of the weights O would be dis-
torted by the differences between the ranges of the
sub-utilities.
C.1 Revenue Maximisation
When negotiating the sale of a good, the reserva-
tion price of the seller is the minimum price that the
seller can accept without losing money for the sale.
The reservation price of the buyer is the maximum
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Fig. 1. Reservation Price of both Buyer and Seller
Fig. 2. Utility function used for Client Classification
price it can pay and do a sale which is beneficial for
its objective (see figure 1).
Equation 3 defines the utility for given revenue:
urv(S) =
Rev −RPs
RPb −RPs
(3)
The main issues of implementing this formula are
to know the reservation price of the buyer, which only
can be speculated. In the simulations performed, it
has been defined an aggressiveness factor, that
increases or decreases RPb in function of the status of
the resources: too much free resources imply that the
prices are too high in a competitive market, so RPs is
being progressively reduced to match the equilibrium
status in sales.
C.2 Client Classification
In this paper, client classification is performed
through price discrimination [13]. The parameter
CP is the Client Priority, it tends to 1 when the
Client is much related to the organisation of the
provider, and tends to 0 when there is absolutely
no relation between the Client and the Provider.
Equation 4 is used to define the utility for client
classification. Given urv and CP , if the Client pri-
ority is high, the utility will be higher when urv is
low (the provider must not be expensive for related
clients). If the Client priority is low, the utility will
be higher when urv is high (see figure 2).
ucc(S) =
{
CP + urv if urv < 1− CP
2− CP − urv otherwise
(4)
C.3 Priorisation of Off-Peak hours
Let ∆t = tf − ti be the interval of time where the
task is executed, Ctot(t) be a constant function whose
value is the number of CPUs of the Provider, C(t)
be a constant function whose value the number of
CPUs requested to the task under negotiation, and
Cused(t) be a function that describes the number of
busy CPUs in the provider over time. Equation 5
is the utility function that is higher when more re-
sources are free, and near 0 when the provider re-
sources are near its maximum occupation.
uph(S) = 1−
∫ tf
ti
Cused(t) + C(t) dt
∫ tf
ti
Ctot(t) dt
(5)
In the simulation, both CPU and Memory are ne-
gotiated. But since CPU is the bottleneck, it is used
as a resource for calculating the peak hours.
C.4 Utility for reputation
Let R0 be the reputation of the provider in ne-
gotiation time, R be the future reputation of the
provider in case of SLA violation (updated as de-
scribed in [14]), and P the probability of violating
an SLA (calculated in base to past statistical data);
Equation 6 shows the utility of keeping the provider’s
reputation:
urp(S) =
P R + (1− P )R0
R0
− 1 (6)
Notice that this utility function ranges from -1 to
0, since losing the current reputation is bad, and
keeping it is neither good nor bad for the provider.
V. Evaluation
This section describes the experiments performed
for checking the validity of the model. A statisti-
cal method is used to check the influence of each of
the parts of the model. Due to resources limitations
(hundreds of different providers are compared in a
same market), the model has been checked using a
simulation of a market.
A. Simulation Environment
A simple market has been simulated to test the va-
lidity of the negotiation model. A Client Broker that
can represent a Web Client or a Grid Client enters in
the market to ask for web workload or for plain re-
sources. The workload for grid has a pseudo-random
distribution and the workload for web services fol-
lows a distribution as shown in figure 3, taken from
a real web application, with peak and off-peak hours.
Grid Clients send a SLA proposal where is speci-
fied the plain resources (CPU and Memory) to buy,
the duration of the job, and a time interval where
the job can be executed (bigger than the duration,
to let the EERM schedule the best execution time).
Web Service Clients send a required workload for
a service, and a fixed time interval to use the ser-
vices (there is no arbitrary schedule of the reserva-
tion, since web users want the services for the same
moment).
A Client looks for potential providers in the mar-
ket discovery and sends SLA Proposals to all of them.
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Fig. 3. Sample of Daily workload of a Web Server
Dem. exc. Off. exc. Equil.
Avg. Price 0.487 -0.402 -0.452
Revenue -0.542 -0.410 -0.454
TABLE I
Correlations between orv and the average price per
CPU used and the total revenue
After that, the providers accept/deny the proposals
and return to it a time allocation and a price, based
on the maximisation of their utility function. Fi-
nally, the Client chooses the Provider with a best
price and time schedule for its interests and sends it
a confirmation.
The provider can violate the SLA due to an in-
ternal error, or because it receives a proposal from
another Client that can not be allocated but is inter-
esting to accept it and cancel the other (it is decided
by the utility function having into account objectives
such as client classification or revenue maximisation)
[12], [7] . This violation will affect to the reputation
of the provider, which is taken into account by the
Client in negotiation time.
The simulation is performed in a competitive mar-
ket with 100 providers, whose objective weights of
the utility function are generated randomly.
B. Simulation Results
This section shows the results of the simulation
in terms of the four objectives described in section
IV-C.
B.1 Revenue Maximisation
Table I shows how the influence of orv in the aver-
age price per CPU/hour and the total revenue of the
provider in function to the market status: demand
excess, offer excess, and equilibrium [15].
In an Demand Excess scenario, where the provider
can be more aggressive in its negotiations (because
there are more clients interested on acquiring its
services), it can be observed a positive correlation
between orv and the average price per CPU/hour.
However the correlation with the total revenue is neg-
ative, because higher prices will entail clients to look
for other providers and there are fewer sales of re-
sources. When there is Offer Excess or the market
is in Equilibrium, orv has a negative influence both
Dem. exc. Off. exc. Equil.
Avg. Price -0.504 -0.166 -0.199
Revenue 0.280 -0.143 -0.130
Avg. Affinity 0.603 0.249 0.314
TABLE II
Correlations between occ and the average price per
CPU, the total revenue and the average affinity of
clients
Dem. exc. Off. exc. Equil.
Avg. Price 0.292 0.471 0.586
Revenue 0.243 0.451 0.527
TABLE III
Correlations between oph and the average price per
CPU used and the total revenue
in the revenue and in the average price, because the
sales are very low and the aggressiveness coefficient
defined in IV-C.1 decreases dramatically.
B.2 Client Classification
Table II shows the effectiveness of the inclusion of
occucc(S) in the general utility function: the higher
is occ, the higher is the affinity. This can be specially
observed when there is a demand excess and all the
prices grow dramatically: the providers with high
affinity are a refuge for the clients, where they can
get better prices.
As described in section IV-C.2, ucc is strongly re-
lated with urv. Table II reflects this relation as a
negative correlation between the occ and the aver-
age price. However, related to the total revenue, the
correlation is positive in the demand excess scenario
because providers with low prices sell more resources.
B.3 Priorisation of off-peak hours
Workload for Web Services have fixed intervals
but an irregular distribution (figure 3), and work-
load for Grid Tasks have a random distribution, but
since they are not real-time applications, they can
be scheduled to be executed in the future. Figure 4
shows how the inclusion of ophuph(S) in U(S) makes
the providers the possibility for giving better prices
to the clients in off-peak hours and, in consequence,
the Grid Jobs are automatically executed when the
Web Services workload is low.
Table III shows how oph has a positive influence on
the money earned by the provider. This is because
the higher is oph, more jobs are allocated in the off-
peak hours and the provider earns in this time slot
a money that otherwise would not earn, and it also
makes lower the price of peak hours, making the re-
sources more attractive for web-services clients.
B.4 Reputation
Figure 5 shows clearly the importance of keeping a
high reputation. In the experiments, the revenue in-
creases almost linearly with the reputation. At equal
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Fig. 4. Allocation in time of workloads divided by Web Ser-
vices or Grid
Fig. 5. Relation between reputation and revenue
prices, a Client will choose the Provider with higher
reputation. The alternative to providers with low
reputation is to decrease their prices.
VI. Conclusions and future work
This paper intends to be a step forward in the
modelling and evaluation of utility functions for ne-
gotiations in utility computing markets. The simula-
tions show how a provider can perform complex ac-
tions by only maximising a multi-dimensional utility
function. The contribution of these experiments lies
in the usage of non-additive utility functions, more
difficult to maximise, but assume that the terms un-
der negotiation are not independent between them.
The proposed non-additive utility function consid-
ers the possibility of having multiple objectives in
a same entity, such as revenue maximisation, client
classification, reputation or load-balancing in time.
In order to keep the efficiency both in economic
and performance terms, most of the parameters that
compose the utility function are collected dynami-
cally from the resource-level information. The sim-
ulations performed demonstrate how the objectives
can be partially achieved by balancing correctly their
weights in the utility function.
This work leaves open some lines for future re-
search: the first is to improve and extend utility
functions and to work on better methods for their
maximisation; other future work is to evaluate the
validity of the model in real environments, not sim-
ulations, taking real data from the resource fabrics,
and compare it with other existing models.
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